- Hannah and Sam are interviewed separately.
- Model 1 – Player 1 plays ‘tit for tat’ as he is not sure Player 2 will act rationally.
- Assumptions: Assumptions
- The paper suggested that repeated prisoner’s dilemma is different from other Nash Equilibria.
- Probability that in t the subject has intention to deviate.

## The Prisoner’s Dilemma constitutes a problem in game theory. In its classical model Prisoner’s Dilemma is presented as follows | |

tarix | 08.12.2017 |

ölçüsü | 458 b. |

## The Prisoner’s Dilemma constitutes a problem in game theory. In its classical model Prisoner’s Dilemma is presented as follows:## The Prisoner’s Dilemma constitutes a problem in game theory. In its classical model Prisoner’s Dilemma is presented as follows:## Hannah and Sam are interviewed## separately.## They have the option to## either cooperate or defect.
## Model 1 – Player 1 plays ‘tit for tat’ as he is not sure Player 2 will act rationally.## Model 1 – Player 1 plays ‘tit for tat’ as he is not sure Player 2 will act rationally.## Model 2 – There is 2 sided uncertainty about stage payoffs.## Conclusion:## Although it is more beneficial for both players to co-operate, it cannot be guaranteed that it will occur in every single sequential equilibrium.
## Assumptions:## Assumptions:## Game is repeated for a fixed number of times known to both players in advance.## Players act in a rational manner.## Conclusions:## Tacit co-operation > non co-operation.## Explained by player’s monetary incentive – incentive to gain utility from co-operation.## Results that don’t follow suit maybe justified by Krep’s idea of incomplete information of the other player’s payoff.
## The paper suggested that## repeated prisoner’s dilemma is different from other Nash Equilibria.## The paper suggested that## repeated prisoner’s dilemma is different from other Nash Equilibria.## Suggestions from the paper:- As the number of repetitions increases, the chance of co-operation increases.
- Incomplete information about players’ opinions, motivations or behaviours can explain the observed co-operation.
## Conclusions :## If the players are restricted to using finite automata of a fixed size, then for a sufficiently large number of repetitions, there is an equilibrium that yields a payoff close to the co-operative one.
## t## t## p## k## Probability that in round t a randomly chosen subject has intention to deviate periods 1 – k.## t k t## S = ∑ p## k m=1 m## Probability that in t the subject has intention to deviate.
## Can co-operation ever be achieved in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma?
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